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NOTES AND COMMENTS

measure of compensation, would have given the upper hand to management, the authority of the State then becoming a hobble upon the bargaining strength of labor. 32 In the Pewee case (involving, of course,
losses instead of profits) there was no discussion of bargaining powers,
but Justice Black would have given the advantage to management:
clearly, a company which is losing money as Pewee was 33will have no
incentive to settle its -differences with the union so long as all its losses
are borne by someone else; more than that, such a decision would be a
strong incentive toward continuation of Government control, and might
even induce some companies to seek such control. The concurring
opinion (and the holding) does not offer asylum to the financially sick,
but it, too, does seem to favor management, since the company, upon
settlement, would accomplish nothing more than the assumption of
whatever increase was finally agreed upon. In either of these two situations, whether or not the employees were satisfied with their temporary
agreement would matter little or nothing to management, economically
speaking; but if they were satisfied then they also would have at least
no particular reason to strive for de-control, thus compounding the odds
against good-faith bargaining. Under the dissent's view, however, the
company would have had to pay everything, including the increase in
wages, and, consequently, the question of advantage to one side or the
other would seem to depend solely upon how satisfied each was with
the temporary settlement. It is submitted that this view is preferable
to either of the other two in respect of labor-management relations,
inasmuch as Government's place in that respect should be "in the middle"
-favoring, as nearly as possible, neither side.3 4
L. K. FuRGuRsoN, JR.
Liens-Subcontractors-Acquisition and Priorities
In 1874, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held, in Wilkie v.
Bray,1 that there was no right to a lien under the statute2 providing for
mechanic's, laborer's, or materialman's liens unless there was a contract
" For a discussion of this problem (which, however, apparently leaves open the
question of what is fair rental value under such circumstances) see Gerhart, Strikes
and Eminent Domain, 30 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 116 (1946).
"Net loss for the period of seizure (May 1 to October 12, 1943) was $36,128.96.
""The greatest danger in the establishment of government seizure policy is
that the normal processes of collective bargaining will be disrupted. Crisis measures should be reserved for crisis problems, voluntary mediation for normal collective bargaining. This implies two requirements: first, that voluntary mediation
machinery of the government should be perfected before emphasis is placed on
supplementary procedures; second, that seizure should not be permittd to be used
as an instrument of economic pressure by either management or labor." Teller,
Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60 HARv. L. REV. 1017, 1054 (1947).
71 N. C. 205 (1874).
N. C. Laws 1868-69, c. 206, §1, now, N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1950).
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with the owner creating the relationship of debtor and creditor.8 Consequently, subcontractors were not able to enjoy the benefits of these
liens. Their contracts were not with the owner, but rather with the
principal contractor. In 1880,4 however, the General Assembly made
provision for a lien for subcontractors. 5
A subcontractor is one who has entered into a contract for the furnishing of labor or material, or both, with the person who has already
contracted with the owner of the property for such labor or material. 6
There is no privity of contract between the subcontractor and the
property owner, nor does the relationship of debtor and creditor ever
arise between them.
When the subcontractor has furnished labor or material to his principal contractor under the subcontract, the debtor-creditor relationship
arises between the subcontractor and the principal contractor. At this
point the subcontractor may be in a position to acquire his lien. Whether
or not this lien may be acquired depends on two things. First, there
must be a balance due on the contract between the owner and the principal contractor. 7 Second, there inust be notice given to the property
owner of the amount the principal contractor owes to the subcontractor. 8
The requirement that a balance must be owing the principal contractor by the owner is essential. The subcontractor cannot acquire a
lien on the property of the owner in excess of "the amount due the
original contractor at the time of notice given."
As a direct consequence of this, where the owner has paid the principal contractor in full
'Accord, Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S.E. 2d 324 (1942) ; Boykin v.
Logan, 203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932) ; Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v.
Southern Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90 S.E. 923 (1916) ; Weathers v. Borders,
124 N. C. 610, 32 S.E. 881 (1899) ; Nicholson v. Nichols, 115 N. C. 200, 20 S. E.
294 (1894).
'N. C. Laws 1880, c. 44, §§1, 3.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950) "All subcontractors and laborers who are
employed to furnish or who do furnish labor or material for the building, repairing
or altering any house or other improvement on real estate, have a lien on said
house and real estate for the amount of such labor done or material furnished, ..
'Lester v. Houston, 101 N. C. 605, 8 S.E. 366 (1888).
'IN. C. GmE.STAT. §§44-6, 8, 9 (1950), Schnepp v. Richardson, 222 N. C. 228,
22 S.E. 2d 555 (1942); Rose v. Davis, 188 N. C. 355, 124 S.E. 576 (1942);
Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Southern Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90
S. E. 923 (1916); Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, 172 N. C. 354, 90
S. E. 312 (1916) ; Orinoco Supply Co. v. Masonic Home, 163 N. C. 513, 79 S.E.
964 (1913) ; Decker Bros. v. Flack, 152 N. C. 600, 68 S.E. 16 (1910).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§44-8, 9 (1950). Schnepp v. Richardson, supra note 7;
Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S.E. 146 (1918);
Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, supra note 7; Borden Brick Co. v.
Pulley, 168 N. C. 371, 84 S.E. 513 (1915) ; Morganton Mfg. Co. v.Andrews, 165
N. C. 285, 81 S. E. 418 (1914) ; Morganton Hardware Co. v. Graded Schools, 151

N. C. 507, 66 S.E. 583 (1909); Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S.E. 794
(1896) ; Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S.E. 35 (1891);
Pinkston v. Young, 104 N. C. 102, 10 S.E. 133 (1889).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950).
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in advance, the subcontractor cannot acquire a lien 1°0 In connection
with this, it is to be noticed that a subsequent promise by the owner to
the subcontractor to pay the debt of the principal contractor is generally
without consideration.'" Also, it comes under the Statute of Frauds
requiring such a guaranty promise to be in writing.' 2 However, even
though at the time the notice is given to the owner there is nothing
owed by the owner to the principal contractor, any subsequent amount
due the principal contractor by the owner under the same contract is
subject to the lien of the subcontractor.'
In contrast with the liens for labor and materials as acquired by the
principal contractor, the subcontractor's lien does not have to be filed
publicly with the clerk of the superior court.' 4 However, a notice must
be served on the owner of the property. This notice may be given by
two methods. First, the principal contractor is required by law 15 to
furnish to the owner, before receiving any part of the contract price,
an itemized statement of the amount owing to any subcontractor. When
this notice is given the owner, a lien arises in favor of the subcontractor.1 6 Second, as a safeguard in the event the principal contractor fails
to give the above notice, the subcontractor may give notice in the form
of an itemized statement of the amount owed to him by the principal
contractor. 17 When this is done, the lien is perfected. Either of these
notices, to be effectual in establishing the lien, must show the amount
owed by the principal contractor to particular subcontractors and the
specific work or materials for which the amount is due.' 8 A notice of
a general indebtedness of the principal contractor is not sufficient. 19
Also, the mere fact that the owner is aware that certain people have
furnished labor or material is not sufficient 2 0
"Roberts & Johnson Lumber Co. v. Horton, 232 N. C. 419, 61 S. E. 2d 100
(1950) ; Dixon v. Ipock, 212 N. C. 363, 193 S. E. 392 (1937) ; Rose v. Davis, 188
N. C. 355, 124 S. E. 576 (1924) ; Orinoco Supply Co. v. Masonic Home, 163 N. C.
513, 79 S. E. 964 (1913); Decker Bros. v. Flack, 152 N. C. 600, 68 S. E. 16
(1910).

(lRoberts & Johnson Lumber Co. v. Horton, supra note 10.

' N. C. GEN. STAT. §22-1 (1943) ; Roberts & Johnson Lumber Co. v. Horton,
232 N. C. 419, 61 S. E. 2d 100 (1950).
" Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146
(1918); Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, 172 N. C. 354, 90 S. E. 312
(1916);
Borden Brick Co. v. Pulley, 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E. 513 (1915).
14
N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-10 (1950) ; Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank,
supra note 13; Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 165 N. C. 285, 81 S. E. 418
(1914).
"0 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§44-8, 12 (1950).
" Economy Pumps, Inc. v. Woolworth Co., 220 N. C. 499, 17 S. E. 2d 639
(1941); Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146
(1918); Pinkston v. Young, 104 N. C. 102, 10 S. E. 133 (1889).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-9 (1950).
See note 8 supra.
18
Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146 (1918).
'L

Ibid.

'0 Ibid.; Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S. E. 133 (1896).
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Once the subcontractor has perfected his lien he is by substitution
entitled to the rights which the principal contractor could have acquired. 2 1 From this it follows that the relation back rule, applicable to
liens of principal contractors, 22 would apply, thereby making the lien of
the subcontractor effective as of the date of the first furnishing of materials or performance of labor.23 The lien acquired attaches to the full
extent of the owner's property on which the work was done or for which
materials were furnished. 24 However, the claim of the subcontractor
against the owner is limited. It cannot exceed the amount owed the
subcontractor by the principal contractor. Also it cannot, in any event,
exceed the amount owed by the owner to the principal contractor at the
time of the giving of the notice, 25 nor the amount which may subsequently be owing to the principal contractor for additional performance
26
under the same contract.
The subcontractor's lien is preferred over any lien which the principal contractor 27 might have acquired upon the property under the same
transaction 28 until the amount owed by the principal contractor to the
subcontractor is paid. 29 Until the subcontractor's lien has been discharged, it enjoys the same position as to priority as against other creditors of the owner as does a lien acquired by a principal contractor. 30
As between a number of subcontractors, each having acquired a lien,
working under the same principal contractor, there is no preference.
-" Schnepp v. Richardson, 222 N. C. 220, 22 S. E. 2d 555 (1942) ; Borden Brick
Co. v.
Pulley, 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E. 513 (1915).
-2 Note, 29 N. C. L. Rxv. 480 (1951).

23

King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929) ; Harris v. Cheshire, 189

N. C. 219, 126 S. E. 593 (1925) ; McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N. C. 494,

83 S. E. 623 (1914); Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S. E. 794 (1896);

McNeal Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Howland, 111 N. C. 615, 16 S. E. 857 (1892) ;
Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35 (1891); Burr

In..Maultsby, 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888) ; Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N. C.
444 (1874) ; Warren v. Woodard, 70 N. C. 382 (1874).

N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950). See also Lanier v. Bell, 81 N. C. 337
(1879).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950). "The claim of the subcontractor or materialman supplants that of the contractor and the duty of the owner to pay is an independent and primary obligation created by statute. The owner is liable to the
-

23

subcontractor, however, only in the event he received notice of the claim prior to
the settlement with the principal contractor and then only to the extent of the unexpended contract price still retained by him." Schnepp v. Richardson, 222 N. C.
228, 229, 22 S. E. 2d 555, 557 (1942) ; Widenhouse v. Russ, 234 N. C. 382,- S. E.
2d

-

(1951).

" Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146 (1918);
Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, 172 N. C. 354, 90 S. E. 312 (1916);
Borden Brick Co. v. Pulley, 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E. 513 (1915).
" For a discussion of mechanic's, laborer's and materialman's liens as acquired
by principal
contractors see Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 480 (1951).
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950); Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109
N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35 (1891) ; Lester v. Houston, 101 N. C. 605, 8 S. E. 366 (1888).
230 Lester v. Houston, supra note 28.
Note, 29 N. C. L. Rv. 480 (1951).
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Each is entitled to his pro rata share of the amount that the owner retained, or should have retained, of the contract price owed to the principal contractor at the time notice was given.3 1 Any payment made
by the owner to the principal contractor after the notice of the amount
due the subcontract'or from the principal contractor is given does not in
any way decrease the claim which the subcontractor may assert against
32
the owner.
Should the owner refuse to retain the required amount of the contract price after notice or if he should refuse to pay the same over to
the subcontractor, the subcontractor may proceed to enforce his lien. 33
An action to enforce this lien is essentially the same in an action to
foreclose a mortgage on real property. Hence, the proper venue is in
the county in which the property is located.3 4 In suing to enforce the
lien against the owner, or rather his property, the subcontractor must
join as a party defendant the principal contractor as he is the primary
debtor. Until the subcontractor has established his claim against the
principal contractor he cannot maintain an action against the owner.3 5
Suit to enforce a subcontractor's lien must be brought within six
months from the time of the serving of notice on the owner.36 Failure
to bring suit within this period discharges the lien. 3 7

In this event,

however, the subcontractor may nevertheless maintain a personal action
against the owner.38 This personal action is allowed on the theory that
the amount which the owner should have retained after the notice given
by the subcontractor is in the nature of a trust fund 39 for the benefit of
the subcontractor.
Unfortunately, the decisions have left some of the aspects of lien
law as it pertains to subcontractors somewhat in doubt. An application
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-11 (1950) ; Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co.,
176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146 (1918) ; Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Southern
Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90 S. E. 923 (1916) ; Bond v. Pickett Cotton Mills,
166 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 936 (1914) ; Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 165 N. C.
285, 81 S. E. 418 (1914) ; Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt, 147 N. C. 639, 61 S. E. 620
(1908).
", N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-9 (1950) ; Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109
N. C. 658, 14 S.E. 35 (1891).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. §44-9 (1950).
"Penland v. Red Hill Methodist Church, 226 N. C. 171, 37 S. E. 2d 177
(1946).
"Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35 (1891).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. §44-43 (1950); Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt, 147 N. C. 639,
61 S, E. 620 (1908).
'7N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-48 (1950) Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt, supra note 36.
" Porter v. Case, 187 N. C. 629, 122 S. E. 483 (1924) ; Campbell v. Hall, 187
N. C. 464, 121 S. E. 761 (1924); Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Southern
Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90 S. E. 923 (1916); Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt,
147 N. C. 639, 61 S.E. 620 (1908).
" Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146 (1918);
Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Southern Aluminum Co., supra note 38. Bond
v. Pickett Cotton Mills, 166 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 936 (1914).
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of the present lien law to certain facts can produce some anomalous
situations. Suppose 0, the owner of certain property, contracted with
C for the building of a house. C commenced work on July 1. On
August 1, a mortgage executed by 0 to M was properly recorded. On
September 1, pursuant to a contract between S and C, S furnished
certain materials that were used in the finishing of the house. On
October 1, after the completion of the house, C filed notice of lien in
the office of the clerk of the superior court. On November 1, S, having
received no payment from C who in turn had received no payment from
0, gave sufficient notice to 0 of the amount due S by C. Since 0 had
become insolvent and his property was not of sufficient value to pay off
the three4" claims in full, the problem is which lien shall have priority.
As between C and M, by application of the rule of relation back to
the date of the initial furnishing of labor or materials, the mechanic's
lien of C is superior to the mortgage subsequently recorded. 4 1 As between C's mechanic's lien and S's lien for material, S's lien is superior
being so preferred by the express words of the statute creating it.42 By
elementary logic it would seem to follow that S's lien would be superior
to M's mortgage. However, by close analysis and application of the
previously discussed principles of law, this result need not necessarily
follow.
The initial furnishing of materials by S was subsequent to the recordation of M's mortgage. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held
that the relation back rule applies to liens of subcontractors. 43 Such
application fixes the effectiveness of S's lien at the time of the initial
furnishing of material. Consequently, if this theory is followed, S's
lien is subsequent and hence inferior to M's mortgage.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has also held that when the
subcontractor perfects his lien he is substituted to the rights of the
original contractor.4 4 If this is the case, C's lien being superior to the
mortgage, S's lien would be superior to the mortgage by substitution.
Suppose, however, instead of the above situation, M's mortgage,
having been recorded before any work was done, was clearly superior to
both C's lien and S's lien. Also, the value of the property had declined
to such an extent that it was sufficient only to pay off the claims of M

"o
Though there are three claims against O's property, the total amount of these
claims is only the sum of M's claim and C's claim-S's claim being in amount a
part1of C's claim.
' 2 Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 480 (1951).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950); Lester v. Houston, 101 N. C. 605, 8 S. E.
366 (1888).
"' Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S.E. 794 (1896) ; Lookout Lumber Co.
v. Mansion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S.E. 35 (1891).
"Note 21 supra.
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and S. The question arises as to whether or not S's lien for furnishing
materials can defeat O's homestead exemption.
The North Carolina Constitution 4 5 provides that the mechanic's and
laborer's liens can defeat the homestead exemption; whereas, the materialman's lien being purely statutory cannot. 46 C's lien is a mechanic's
lien and by express provision can defeat the homestead. S's lien is a
materialman's lien and being purely statutory cannot as such defeat the
homestead exemption. If S's lien is not allowed to defeat the homestead
exemption and C's lien is, S has lost his only security. This would
seem contrary to the established policy of protecting the rights of the
subcontractor as against the principal contractor. If, however, S's materialman's lien is substituted to the rights of C's mechanic's lien and
thus allowed to -defeat the homestead exemption, this would be promoting a materialman's lien to the elevated status of a mechanic's lien in
law, though not in fact. Though this result may be desirable as protection for the subcontractor, it certainly should not be attained by
giving liens purely statutory the power to defeat rights conferred by the
Constitution.
A satisfactory solution of these problems under the existing lien law
is not apparent. 47 However, in the light of the possible confusion that
application of the existing lien law might produce, a constitutional
amendment protecting the subcontractor followed by a revision of our
lien law would seem desirable.
WILLIAM H. BOBBITT, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Tort Liability-Emergency Use of
Fire Department Inhalators
Traffic laws frequently exempt from their operation certain vehicles
engaged in public service emergencies 1 or give to such vehicles certain
rights of way over other vehicles on the streets and highways.2 Such
'IN. C. CoNsT. Art. X, §4.
"Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1939) ; Broyhill v.
Gaither, 119 N. C. 443, 26 S. E. 31 (1896) ; Cumming v. Bloodworth, 87 N. C. 83
(1882).
' The subcontractor's lien for materials would likely be held to be inferior to

the constitutionally created homestead rights. However, it is submitted that this
would not solve the problem.
IE.g, N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-145 (Supp. 1951): "The speed limitations set
forth . .. shall not apply to vehicles . . .of the police in the chase or apprehen-

sion of violators of the law . . . nor to fire department or patrol vehicles when
traveling in response to a fire alarm, nor to . ..ambulances when traveling in
emergencies, nor to vehicles... [of the] Utilities Commission when... regulating
and checking ... traffic and speed. .

.

.This provision shall not, however, protect

the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the
of others."
safety
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-156 (b) (1943): "The driver of a vehicle .
IE.g.,
shall yield the right of way to police and fire department vehicles and public and

